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Over the last 20 years, some financial events, such as devaluations or defaults, have 
triggered an immediate adverse chain reaction in other countries -- which we call fast 
and furious contagion.  Yet, on other occasions, similar events have failed to trigger any 
immediate international reaction.  We argue that fast and furious contagion episodes  
are characterized by "the unholy trinity": (i) they follow a large surge in capital flows; 
(ii) they come as a surprise; and (iii) they involve a leveraged common creditor. In 
contrast, when similar events have elicited little international reaction, they were widely 
anticipated and took place at a time when capital flows had already subsided. 
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  For reasons that are not always evident at the time, some financial events, such as 
the devaluation of a currency or an announcement of default on sovereign debt 
obligations, trigger an immediate and startling adverse chain reaction among countries 
within a region and in some cases across regions. This phenomenon, which we dub “fast 
and furious” contagion, was manifest after the floatation of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997, 
as it quickly triggered financial turmoil across east Asia.  Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines were hit the hardest—by December 1997, their currencies had 
depreciated (on average) by about 75 percent.  Similarly, when Russia defaulted on its 
sovereign bonds on August 18, 1998, the effects were felt not only in several of the 
former Soviet republics, but also in Hong Kong, Brazil, Mexico, many other emerging 
markets, and the riskier segments of developed markets.1  The economic impact of these 
shocks on the countries unfortunate enough to be affected included declines in equity 
prices, spikes in the cost of borrowing, scarcity in the availability of international capital, 
and declines in the value of their currencies and in output.   
Table 1 presents summary material for recent contagion episodes.  The first column 
lists the country, the date that marks the beginning of the episode, the nature of the shock, 
and currency market developments in the crisis country, while the remaining columns 
include information on the existence and nature of common external shocks, the 
suspected main mechanism for propagation across national borders, and the countries that 
were most affected. 
                                                 
1  The international financial turmoil that followed Russia’s default was compounded in a 
significant manner by another negative surprise announcement: on September 2, 1998 it 
became public knowledge that Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), owing to its 
large exposure to Russia and other high-yield assets, had gone bankrupt. 
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Table 1 
Financial Crises with Immediate International Repercussions: 1980-2000 
 
Origin of the shock, 
country and date 
Nature of common  external 
shock, if any 
Contagion mechanisms Countries affected 
    
On August 1982 
Mexico defaults on its 
external bank debt.  By 
December, the peso 
had depreciated by 100 
percent. 
Between 1980 and 1985, 
commodity prices fell by 
about 31 percent.  US short 
term interest rates rise to 
about 7 percent, the highest 
levels since the depression. 
U.S. banks, heavily 
exposed to Mexico, 
retrenched from 
emerging markets 
With the exception of 
Chile, Colombia and 
Costa Rica all countries in 
Latin America defaulted.   
    
On September 8, 1992 
the Finnish markka is 
floated and the ERM 
crisis unfolds. 
High interest rates in 
Germany. Rejection by 
Danish voters of the 
Maastricht treaty. 
Hedge funds. All the countries in the 
European Monetary 
System except Germany. 
    
On December 20, 1994 
Mexico announced a 
15 percent devaluation 
of the peso.  It sparked 
a confidence crisis and 
by March 1995 the 
peso’s value had 
declined by about 100 
percent. 
From January 1994 to 
December, the Federal 
Reserve raised the federal 
funds rate by  . 
Mutual funds sell off 
other Latin American 
countries, notably 
Argentina and Brazil.  
Massive bank runs and 
capital flight in 
Argentina. 
Argentina suffered the 
most, losing about 20 
percent of deposits in 
early 1995. Brazil was 
next, while losses in other 
countries in the region 
limited to declines in 
equity prices. 
    
On July 2 1997, 
Thailand announces 
that the baht will be 
allowed to float. By 
January 1998 the baht 
had depreciated by 
about 113 percent. 
The yen depreciated by 
about 51 % against the US 
dollar during April 1995 and 
April 1997.  Given the 
Asian currencies link to the 
US dollar, this translated 
into a significant 
appreciation for their 
currencies as well. 
Japanese banks, 
exposed to  Thailand, 
retrenched from  
emerging Asia. As 
Korea is affected, 
European banks also 
withdraw. 
Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, and the 
Philippines were hit 
hardest.  Financial 
markets in Singapore and 
Hong Kong also 
experienced some 
turbulence. 
    
On August 18, 1998, 
Russia defaults on its 
domestic bond debt. 
Between July 1998 and 
January 1999, the 
ruble depreciated by 
262 percent.  On 
September 2, 1998, it 
became public 
knowledge that LTCM 
had gone bankrupt. 
 
With heavy exposure to 
Russia and other high-yield 
instruments, Long Term 
Capital Management 
(LTCM) is revealed to be 
bankrupt. 
Margin calls and 
leveraged hedge funds 
fueled the sell off in 
other emerging and 
high yield markets.  It 
is difficult to 
distinguish contagion 
from Russia and fear of 
another LTCM. 
 
Apart from several of the 
former Soviet republics, 
Hong Kong, Brazil, and 
Mexico were hit hardest.  
But most emerging and 
developed markets were 
affected. 
Sources:  International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, dates of the default or restructurings 
are taken from Beim and Calomiris (2001), Standard and Poor’s Credit Week and Debt Cycles in the World 
Economy (1992). 
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The challenge for economic researchers is to explain why the number of financial 
crises that did not have significant international consequences is far greater than those 
that did.  It is no surprise that a domestic crisis (no matter how deep) in countries that are 
approximately autarkic (either voluntarily or otherwise) will not likely have immediate 
repercussions in world capital markets.  The countries may be large (China or India) or 
comparatively small (Bolivia and Guinea-Bissau.)  More intriguing cases of “contagion 
that never happened” are those where the crisis country is relatively large (at least by 
emerging market standards) and is reasonably well integrated to the rest of the world 
through trade or finance.  Along with the fast and furious contagion episodes, these are 
the cases we focus on in this paper.    
Some recent examples of financial crises with limited immediate consequences 
include Brazil’s devaluation of the real on January 13, 1999 and eventual flotation on 
February 1, the Argentine default and abandonment of the Convertibility Plan in 
December 2001, and Turkey’s devaluation of the lira on February 22, 2001. Given that 
Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina are relatively large emerging markets, these episodes could 
have been–at least potentially--as highly “contagious” as the Thai and Russian crises.  
Nonetheless, financial markets shrugged off these events, despite the fact that it was 
evident at the time that some of these shocks would have trade and real sector 
repercussions on neighboring countries over the medium term.2  Table 2 presents some 
summary material for these episodes, in a format parallel to Table 1. 
                                                 
2 As Brazil is Argentina’s largest trading partner, the sharp depreciation of the real (about 
70 percent between January and end February) left the Argentine peso overvalued.  
Similarly, through its extensive financial and trade links, Uruguay’s economy (as it has 
through history) would be whiplashed by the Argentine crisis. 
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Table 2 
Selected Financial Crises without Immediate International Repercussions:  
1999-2001 
 
Origin of the shock: 
country and date 
Background on the run-up 
to the shock 
Spillover mechanisms Countries affected  
    
On January 13, 1999 
Brazil devalues the 
real and eventually 
floats on February 1.  
Between early January 
and end-February the 
real depreciates by 70 
percent. 
 
The crawling peg exchange 
rate policy (the Real Plan) 
that was adopted in July 
1994 to stabilize  
inflation is abandoned.  
There is an increase in 
volatility in some of 
larger equity markets 
and Argentina spreads 
widened.  Equity 
markets in Argentina 
and Chile rallied. These 
effects lasted only a few 
days. 
Significant and protracted 
effect on Argentina, as 
Brazil is Argentina’s 
largest trading partner. 
    
Turkey,  
February 22, 2001 
Devaluation and 
floatation of the lira 
Facing substantial external 
financing needs, in late 
November 2000, rumors of 
the withdrawal of external 
credit lines to Turkish banks 
triggered a foreign exchange 
outflows and overnight rates 
soared to close to 2,000 
percent.   
 There has been some 
conjecture that the 
Turkish crisis may have 
exacerbated the 
withdrawal of investors 
from Argentina but given 
the weakness in 
Argentina’s fundamentals 
at the time, it is difficult 
to suggest developments 
owed to contagion. 
    
On December 23, 
2001, the president of 
Argentina announces 
intentions to default. 
Following several waves of  
capital flight, on December 
1st capital controls are 
introduced.   
Bank deposits fall by 
more than 30 percent in 
Uruguay, as Argentines 
withdraw deposits from 
Uruguayan banks.  
Significant effects on 
economic (trade and 
tourism) activity in 
Uruguay. 
 
Uruguay and, to a much 
lesser extent, Brazil 
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This paper seeks to address the central question of why financial contagion across 
borders occurs in some cases but not others.3  Throughout the paper, we stress that there 
are three key elements—an abrupt reversal in capital inflows, surprise announcements, 
and a leveraged common creditor (the unholy trinity)--that distinguish the cases where 
contagion occurs from those where it does not.   
First, contagion usually followed on the heels of a surge in inflows of international 
capital and, more often than not, the initial shock or announcement pricked the capital 
flow bubble, at least temporarily.  The capacity for a swift and drastic reversal of capital 
flows—the so-called “sudden stop” problem—played a significant role. 4  
 Second, the announcements that set off the chain reactions came as a surprise to 
financial markets.  The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated events appears 
critical, as forewarning allows investors to adjust their portfolios in anticipation of the 
event.  
Third, in all cases where there were significant immediate international repercussions, 
a leveraged common creditor was involved—be it commercial banks, hedge funds, 
                                                 
3 Of course, there are historical examples of fast and furious contagion before the last few 
decades.  Commonly cited examples of contagion include the first Latin American debt 
crisis -- which began with Peru’s default in April 1826 -- and the international financial 
crisis of 1873.  Going back even further in time, Neal and Weidenmeir (2002) also 
discuss the “contagion” dimension of the Tulip Mania of the 1630s and the Mississippi 
and South Sea Bubbles of 1719-20.  Two leading examples of financial crises that did not 
lead to contagion include the well-documented Argentina-Baring crisis of 1890, and the 
United States financial crisis of 1907. For detailed accounts of historical episodes of 
financial crises, see Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), Bordo and Murshid (2000), 
Kindleberger (2000), and Neal and Weidenmier (2002.)   
 
4 See Calvo and Reinhart (2000) for an empirical analysis of sudden stop episodes and 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy. (2003) for a model that traces out the economic 
consequences of sudden stops. 
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mutual funds, or individual bondholders—who helped to propagate the contagion across 
national borders.  
 Before turning to the question of what elements distinguish the cases where 
contagion occurs from those where it does not, however, we provide a brief tour of the 
main theoretical explanations for contagion and the most salient empirical findings on the 
channels of propagation. 
 
What is Contagion? 
 Since the term “contagion” has been used liberally and taken on multiple 
meanings, it is useful to clarify how it will be used in this paper.  We refer to contagion 
as an episode in which there are significant immediate effects in a number of countries 
following an event--that is, when the consequences are fast and furious and evolve over a 
matter of hours or days.  This “fast and furious” reaction is a contrast to cases in which 
the initial international reaction to the news is muted.  The latter cases do not preclude the 
emergence of gradual and protracted effects that may cumulatively have major economic 
consequences.  We refer to these gradual death by a thousand cuts cases as spillovers.  
Common external shocks, such as changes in international interest rates or oil prices, are 
also not automatically included in our working definition of contagion.  Only if there is 
“excess comovement” in financial and economic variables across countries in response to 
a common shock do we consider it contagion. 
 
Theories of Contagion  
 7
Through what channels does a financial crisis in one country spread across 
international borders?  Some models have emphasized investor behavior that gives rise to 
the possibility of herding and fads. It is no doubt possible (if not appealing to many 
economists) that such “irrational exuberance,” to quote Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, influence the behavior of capital flows and financial markets and exacerbate 
the booms as well as the busts.  Other models stress economic linkages through trade or 
finance. This section provides a selective discussion of theories of contagion.  The main 
message conveyed here—consistent with our unholy trinity proposition--is that financial 
linkages (i.e., cross border capital flows and common creditors) and investor behavior 
figure the most prominently in the theoretical  explanations of contagion.  
 
Herding 
 Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) model the fragility of mass behavior 
as a consequence of informational cascades. 5  An information cascade occurs when it is 
optimal for an individual, after observing the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the 
behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his or her own information.  Under 
relatively mild conditions, cascades will almost surely start, and often they will be wrong. 
In those circumstances, a few early individuals can have a disproportionate effect. 
Changes in the underlying value of alternative decisions can lead to “fads,” that is drastic 
and seemingly whimsical swings in mass behavior without obvious external stimulus. 
Banerjee (1992) also develops a model to examine the implications of decisions 
that are influenced by what others are doing. The decisions of others may reflect 
                                                 
5 See Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) for a thoughtful discussion of this 
literature. 
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potentially important information in their possession that is not in the public domain. 
With sequential decision making, people paying attention to what others are doing before 
them end up doing what everyone else is doing (i.e., herding behavior), even when one’s 
own private information suggests doing something different. The herd externality is of 
the positive feedback type:  If we join the crowd, we induce others to do the same.  The 
signals perceived by the first few decision makers–random and not necessarily correct--
determine where the first crowd forms, and from then on, everybody joins the crowd.  
This characteristic of the model captures (to some extent) the phenomena of “excess 
volatility” in asset markets, or the frequent and unpredictable changes in fashions. 
Another story suggests that the channels of transmission arise from the global 
diversification of financial portfolios in the presence of information asymmetries.  Calvo 
and Mendoza (1998), for instance, present a model where the fixed costs of gathering and 
processing country-specific information give rise to herding behavior, even when 
investors are rational.  Because of information costs, there are equilibria in which the 
marginal cost exceeds the marginal gain of gathering information.  In such instances, it is 
rational for investors to mimic market portfolios.  When a rumor favors a different 
portfolio, all investors “follow the herd.” 
 
Trade Linkages  
Some recent models have revived Nurkse’s (1944) classic story of competitive 
devaluations (Gerlach and Smetts, 1996).  Nurkse argued that since a devaluation in a one 
country makes its goods cheaper internationally, it will pressure other countries that have 
lost competitiveness to devalue as well.  In this setting, a devaluation in a second country 
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is a policy decision whose effect on output is expected to be salutary, as it induces 
expenditure-switching (i.e. reduces imports, increases exports, and improves the current 
account.)  An empirical implication of this type of model is that we should observe a high 
volume of trade among the “synchronized” devaluers. As a story of  voluntary contagion, 
this explanation does not square with the fact that central banks often go to great lengths 
to avoid a devaluation in the first place (often by engaging in an active interest rate 
defense of the existing exchange rate, as in Lahiri and Végh, 2003) or by enduring 
massive losses of foreign exchange reserves nor that devaluations have often been 
contractionary.   
 
Financial Linkages 
 Other studies have emphasized the important role of common creditors and 
financial linkages. The “type” of the common creditor may differ across models but the 
story tends to remain consistent.   
In Shleifer and Vishny (1997), arbitrage is conducted by relatively few 
specialized and leveraged investors, who combine their knowledge with resources that 
come from outside investors to take large positions. Funds under management become 
responsive to past performance.  The authors call this Performance Based Arbitrage 
(PBA). In extreme circumstances, when prices are significantly out of line and 
arbitrageurs are fully invested, PBA is particularly ineffective. In these instances, 
arbitrageurs might bail out of the market when their participation is most needed.  That is, 
arbitrageurs face fund withdrawals, and are not very effective in betting against the 
mispricing.  Risk averse arbitrageurs might chose to liquidate, even when they do not 
 10
have to, for fear that a possible further adverse price movement may cause a drastic 
outflow of funds later on.  While the model is not explicitly focused on contagion, one 
could see how an adverse shock that lowers returns (say, like the Mexican peso crisis) 
may lead arbitrageurs to liquidate their positions in other countries that are part of their 
portfolio (Argentina, Brazil, etc.), as they fear future withdrawals. 
Similarly, Calvo (1998) has stressed the role of liquidity.  A leveraged investor 
facing margin calls needs to sell asset holdings. Because of the information asymmetries, 
a “lemons problem” arises and the asset can only be sold at a firesale price. For this 
reason, the strategy will be not to sell the asset whose price has already collapsed, but 
other assets in the portfolio.  In doing so, however, other asset prices fall and the original 
disturbance spreads across markets. 
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) develop a rational expectations model of asset prices 
to explain financial market contagion. In their model, assets’ long run values are 
determined by macroeconomic risk factors, which are shared across countries, and by 
country-specific factors. Contagion occurs when “informed” investors respond to private 
information on a country-specific factor, by optimally rebalancing their portfolio’s 
exposures to the shared macroeconomic risk factors in other countries’ markets. When 
there is asymmetric information in the countries hit by the rebalancing, “uninformed” 
investors cannot fully identify the source of the change in asset demand; they therefore 
respond as if the rebalancing is related to information on their own country (even though 
it is not). As a result, an idiosyncratic shock generates excess co-movement—
contagion—across countries' asset markets. A key insight from the model is that 
contagion can occur between two countries even when contagion via correlated 
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information shocks, correlated liquidity shocks, and via wealth effects are ruled out by 
assumption, and even when the countries do not share common macroeconomic factors, 
provided that both share at least one underlying macroeconomic risk factor with a third 
country, through which portfolio rebalancing can take place.   Their model, like the 
rational herding model of Calvo and Mendoza (1998), has the empirical implication that 
countries with more internationally-traded financial assets and more liquid markets 
should be more vulnerable to contagion.  Small, highly illiquid markets are likely to be 
under-represented in international portfolios to begin with and, as such, shielded from 
this type of contagion. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) focus on is the role of commercial banks in 
spreading the initial shock. The behavior of foreign banks can exacerbate the original 
crisis by calling loans and drying up credit lines, but can also propagate crises by calling 
loans elsewhere.  The need to rebalance the overall risk of the bank’s asset portfolio and 
to recapitalize following the initial losses can lead to a marked reversal in commercial 
bank credit across markets where the bank has exposure. 
 
Other Explanations 
 The so-called “wake-up call hypothesis” (a term coined by Morris Goldstein, 
1998) relies on either investor irrationality or a fixed cost in acquiring information about 
emerging markets.  In this story, once investors “wake up” to the weaknesses that were 
revealed in the crisis country, they will proceed to avoid and move out of countries that 
share some characteristics with the crisis country.  So, for instance, if the original crisis 
country had a large current account deficit and a relatively “rigid” exchange rate, then 
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other countries showing similar features will be vulnerable to similar pressures (see Basu, 
1998, for a formal model).  
 
Channels of Propagation:  The Empirical Evidence 
 As discussed, some theoretical models emphasized trade linkages as a channel for 
the cross-border propagation of shocks, while most models have looked to financial 
markets for an explanation.  
Perhaps because trade in goods and services has a longer history in the post World 
War II period than trade in financial assets, or because of far better data availability, trade 
links have received the most attention in the empirical literature on channels of 
contagion.  Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) find evidence that trade links help 
explain the pattern of contagion in 20 industrial countries over 1959-1993. Glick and 
Rose (1999), who examine this issue for a sample of 161 countries, come to the same 
conclusion.  Glick and Rose (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) also study trade 
linkages which involve competition in a common third market.  While sharing a third 
party is a necessary condition for the competitive devaluation story, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000) argue it is clearly not a sufficient one.  If a country that exports wool to 
the United States devalues, it is not obvious why this would have any detrimental effect 
on a country that exports semiconductors to the United States.  Their study shows that 
third-party trade links is a plausible transmission channel in some cases but not for the 
majority of countries recently battered by contagion. For example, at the time of the 
Asian crisis, Thailand exported many of the same goods to the same third parties as 
Malaysia. This, however, does not explain all the other Asian crisis countries. Bilateral or 
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third party trade also does not appear to carry any weight in explaining the effects of 
Mexico (1994) on Argentina and Brazil.  At the time of Mexico’s 1994 devaluation, only 
about 2 percent of Argentina’s and Brazil’s total exports went to Mexico.  Similarly, 
Brazil hardly trades with Russia, as only 0.2 percent of its exports are destined for 
Russian markets; yet in the weeks following the Russian default Brazil’s interest rate 
spreads doubled and Brazil’s equity prices fell by more than 20 percent.  
 Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) compare countries clustered along the lines of 
trade links versus countries with common bank creditors, and conclude that common 
financial linkages better explains the observed pattern of contagion.  Mody and Taylor 
(2002), who seek to explain the comovement in an exchange market pressures index by 
bilateral and third-party trade and other factors, also cast doubt on the importance of trade 
linkages in explaining the propagation of shocks.  
 Conversely, in many cases of crises without contagion, there are strong trade 
links. About 30 percent of Argentina’s exports are destined for Brazil, yet in the week 
following Brazil’s devaluation, the Argentine equity market increases 12 percent. 
Similarly, nearly 13 percent of Uruguay’s exports are bound for the Argentine market.  
Yet, the main reason why the crisis in Argentina ultimately affected Uruguay was the 
tight financial linkages between the two countries.  Uruguayan banks have (for many 
years) been host to Argentinean depositors, who thought their deposits safer when these 
were denominated in U.S. dollars and kept across the Río de la Plata.  At first, as the 
crisis deepened in Argentina, many deposits fled from Argentine banks and found their 
way to Uruguay. But when the Argentine authorities declared a freeze on bank deposits 
in December 2001, Argentine firms and households began to draw down the deposits 
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they kept at Uruguayan banks.  The withdrawals escalated and became a run on deposits 
amid fears that the Uruguayan central bank would either run out of international reserves 
or (like Argentina) confiscate the deposits.  
 Other studies focused primarily on financial channels of transmission. Frankel 
and Schmukler (1998) and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) show evidence to 
support the idea that US-based mutual funds have played an important role in spreading 
shocks throughout Latin America by selling assets from one country when prices fall in 
another – with Mexico’s 1994 crisis the being a prime example. Caramazza, Ricci, and 
Salgado (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) 
focus on the role played by commercial banks in spreading shocks and inducing a sudden 
stop in capital flows in the form of bank lending, especially in the debt crisis of 1982 and 
the crisis in Asia in 1997.  Mody and Taylor (2002) link contagion to developments in the 
US high yield or “junk” bond market.  The common thread in these papers is that, 
without the financial sector linkages, contagion of the fast and furious variety would be 
unlikely. 
Summing Up  
Table 3 summarizes the some of the arguments about propagation of contagion 
among the five fast and furious cases emphasized earlier:  Mexico in 1982, the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism crises of 1992, Mexico’s currency devaluation in 1994, 
Thailand’s devaluation in 1997, and Russia’s devaluation in 1998. 6  In each case, we 
                                                 
6 For a detailed discussion of the evolution of these contagion episodes, the interested 
reader is referred to IMF World Economic Outlook (January 1993) for the ERM crisis, 
IMF International Capital Markets (August 1995) for the more recent Mexican crisis, 
Nouriel Roubini’s home page http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/  for an excellent 
chronology of the Asian crisis, and IMF World Economic Outlook and International 
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consider the possible trade channel, whether the affected countries shared similar 
characteristics with the crisis country and with each other, and whether a common 
creditor was present with the possible financial channel.   Indeed, Table 3 lays the 
foundation for our unholy trinity of financial contagion proposition, which the next 
section discusses in greater detail.  Several features summarized in Table 3 are worth 
highlighting.  In all five cases, a common leveraged creditor was present, making it 
consistent with the explanations offered by Schleifer and Vishny (1997), Calvo (1998), 
and discussed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).  In three of the five cases, the scope for 
propagation via trade links is virtually nonexistent and in one of the two remaining cases 
(Thailand) the extent of third party competition is with Malaysia, not the other affected 
Asian countries.  Lastly, with the exception of the countries that suffered most from 
Russia/LTCM fallout, the affected countries tended to have large capital inflows and 
relatively fixed exchange rates. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Capital Markets Interim Assessment (December 1998) for Russia’s default and LTCM 
crisis.  Diaz Alejandro (1984) provides a compelling discussion of the debt crisis of the 
early 1980s. 
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Table 3 
Propagation Mechanisms in Episodes of Contagion 
 
Episode Trade Common characteristic across 
affected countries 
Common creditor 
    
Mexico, 
August 1982 
As the entire region was 
affected, trade links are 
significant, even though 
there are low levels of 
bilateral trade among most of 
the affected countries. 
Large fiscal deficits, weak 
banking sectors, dependence on 
commodity prices and heavy 
external borrowing. 
U.S. commercial banks. 
    
Finland, 
September 8, 
1992--ERM 
crisis 
While bilateral exports to 
Finland from the affected 
countries are small, there are 
substantial trade links among 
all the affected countries.  
Large capital  inflows, common 
exchange rate policy as part of 
the EMS. 
Hedge funds. 
    
Mexico, 
December 21, 
1994 
No significant trade links. 
Bilateral trade with 
Argentina and Brazil was 
minimal. Only 2 percent of 
Argentina’s and Brazil’s 
exports were destined to 
Mexico. Little scope for third 
party trade story.  Mexico’s 
exports to the United States 
were very different from 
Argentine and Brazilian 
exports. 
Exchange rate based inflation 
stabilization plans. Significant 
real appreciation of the exchange 
rate and concerns about 
overvaluation. Large capital 
inflows in the run-up to the 
crisis. 
Primarily US 
bondholders, including 
mutual funds. 
    
Thailand, 
July 2 1997 
Bilateral trade with other 
affected countries was very 
limited. Malaysia exported 
similar products to some of 
the same third markets. 
Heavily managed exchange rates 
and large increase in the stock of 
short-term foreign currency debt.   
European and Japanese 
commercial banks 
lending to Thailand, 
Korea, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. Mutual 
Funds sell off Hong 
Kong and Singapore. 
    
Russia/LTCM, 
August 18, 
1998 
Virtually no trade with the 
most affected countries 
(bilateral or third party.)  
Exports from, Brazil, Mexico 
and Hong Kong to Russia 
accounted for 1 percent or 
less of total exports for these 
countries.   
The most liquid emerging 
markets, Brazil, Hong Kong and 
Mexico were most affected.  
These three countries accounted 
for the largest shares of mutual 
fund holdings. 
 
Mutual funds and hedge 
Funds 
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The Unholy Trinity: Capital Inflows, Surprises, and Common Creditors 
Having summarized some of the key findings of the literature on contagion, we 
now return to our central question of why contagion occurs in some instances but not in 
others. 
The Capital Flow Cycle 
Fast and furious contagion episodes are typically preceded by a surge in capital 
inflows which, more often than not, come to an abrupt halt or sudden stop in the wake of 
a crisis.  The inflow of capital may come from banks, other financial institutions, or 
bondholders. The debt contracts typically have short maturities, which means that the 
investors and financial institutions will have to make decisions about rolling over their 
debts – or not doing so.  With fast and furious contagion, investors and financial 
institutions are exposed to the crisis country and often highly leveraged. Thus, the 
investors can be viewed as halfway through the door, ready to back out on short notice. 
 This rising financial exposure to emerging markets is not present to nearly the 
same extent in the crises without major external consequences.  Financial crises that have 
not set off major international dominos have usually unfolded against low volumes of 
international capital flows.  Given lower levels of exposure, investors and institutions in 
the financial sector have a much lower need to adjust their portfolios when the shock 
occurs.  In many instances, because the shock is anticipated, portfolios were adjusted 
prior to the event. 
In all five of the examples from Table 1, the capital flow cycle has also played a 
key role in determining whether the effects of a crisis have significant international 
ramifications. For example,  in the late 1970s, soaring commodity prices, low and 
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sometimes negative real interest rates (as late as 1978 real interest rates oscillated 
between minus two percent and zero), and weak loan demand in the United States made it 
very attractive for U.S. banks to lend to Latin America and other emerging markets—and 
lend they did.  Capital flows, by way of bank lending, surged during this period, as shown 
in  Figure 1. By the early 1980s, the prospects for repayment had significantly changed 
for the worse. U.S. short-term interest rates had risen markedly in nominal terms (the 
federal funds rate went from below 7 percent in mid 1978 to a peak of about 20 percent in 
mid-1981) and in real terms (by mid-1981 real short-term interest rates were around 10 
percent, the highest level since the 1930s.)  Since most of the loans made had either short 
maturities or variable interest rates, the effects were passed on to the borrower relatively 
quickly. Commodity prices had fallen almost 30 percent between 1980 and 1982, and 
many governments in Latin America were engaged in spending sprees that would seal 
their fate and render them incapable of repaying their debts.  In 1981, Argentina’s public 
sector deficit as a percent of GDP was about 13 percent while Mexico’s was 14 percent; 
during 1979-80 Brazil’s deficit was of a comparable order of magnitude.  Prior to 
Mexico’s default in August 1982, one after another of these countries had already 
experienced currency crises, banking crises, or both.  When Mexico ultimately defaulted, 
the highly exposed and leveraged banks retrenched from emerging markets in general and 
Latin America in particular.   
During the decade that followed, there were numerous crises in Latin America, 
including some severe hyperinflations (Bolivia in 1985, and Peru, Argentina, and Brazil 
in 1990)  and other defaults. Yet, these crises had minimal international repercussions, as 
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most of the region was shut out of international capital markets.  The drought in capital 
flows lasted until 1990. 
Figure 1 shows net private capital flows for the contagion episodes of the 1990s, 
while Table 4 provides complementary information on capital flows and capital flight for 
the crisis country and those affected by it.   Again, notice the common pattern of a run-up 
in borrowing followed by a crash at the time of the initial shock and much inflows of 
capital thereafter.  Net private capital flows to Europe had risen markedly and peaked in 
1992 before coming to a sudden stop after the collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
crisis, in which the attempt to hold exchange rates within preset bands fell apart under 
pressure from international arbitrageurs. The crisis in the European Monetary System in 
1992-93 showed that emerging markets do not have a monopoly on vulnerability to 
contagion, although they certainly tend to be more crisis prone.  
  In the case of Mexico, as the devaluation of the peso loomed close late in 1994, 
capital flows were close to their 1992 peak after surging considerably. (As late as 1989, 
Mexico had recorded net large capital outflows.)  The rise in capital flows to the east 
Asian Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (shown in Figure 1) was 
no less dramatic—especially after 1995, when Japanese and European bank lending to 
emerging Asia escalates. 
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Table 4. Capital Flows and Capital Flight on the Eve of Crises 
Episode Capital flow background in crisis 
country 
Capital flow background in other 
relevant countries 1 
Fast and furious episodes 
Exchange Rate Mechanism 
Crisis:   
Finland September 8, 1992 
Net capital flows to Finland had 
risen from less than $2 billion in 
1988 to $9 billion at their peak in 
1990.  Portfolio flows, which 
were about $3 billion in 1988, 
however, hit their peak  prior to 
the crisis in 1992 at $8 billion. 
In 1989 private net capital flows 
to the European Union (EU) were 
about $11 billion (US dollars) in 
1992, on the eve of the crisis 
these had risen to $174 billion. 
Tequila Crisis:  
Mexico, December 21, 1994 
In 1990 private net capital flows 
were less than $10 billion (US 
dollars) by 1993 flows had risen 
to $35 billion. Estimates of 
capital flight showed a 
repatriation through 1994. 
Net flows to the other major Latin 
American countries had also risen 
sharply, for Western Hemisphere 
as a whole it went from net 
outflows in 1989 to inflows of 
$47 billion in 1994. 
Asian Crisis:  
Thailand, July 2, 1997 
From 1993 to 1996 net capital 
flows to Thailand doubled to 
about $20 billion (US dollars). In 
1997 capital outflows amounted 
about $14 billion. 
Flows to emerging Asia had risen 
from less than $10 billion (US 
dollars) to almost $80 billion in 
1996. 
Russian Crisis: August 18, 1998 While total  flows into Russia 
peaked in 1996, foreign direct 
investment peaked in 1998, rising 
from about $0.1 billion in 1992 to 
$2.2 billion in 1998. 
Excluding Asia, which witnessed 
a sharp capital flow reversal in 
1997, capital flows to other 
emerging markets remained 
buoyant through 1997 and early 
1998, having risen from about $9 
billion in 1990 to $125 billion in 
1997.  
Cases without immediate international consequences 
Brazil Devalues and Floats: 
February 1, 1999 
Repatriation of capital flight 
amounted to about 3 percent of 
GDP in 1996. By early 1998 it 
had reversed into capital flight. 
Yet net capital flows did not 
change much between 1997 and 
1999, currency crisis 
notwithstanding.  
At about $54 billion (US dollars) 
in 1999,capital flows to Western 
Hemisphere well below their 
peak ($85 billion) in 1997. 
Turkey floats the lira 
February 22, 2001 
While repatriation amounted to 
about 2 percent of GDP during 
1997-1999, capital flight began in 
earnest in 2000. 
Following the successive crises in 
Asia (1997) and Russia (1998) 
private capital flows to emerging 
markets had all but dried up by 
2001.  At a meager $20 billion in 
2001, flows were $200 billion off 
their peak in 1996. 
Argentina Defaults: 
December 23, 2001 
 
Until 1998, capital abroad was 
being repatriated.  By 1999, 
however, capital flight amounted 
to 5 percent of GDP. After 
several waves of bank runs, 
capital flight was estimated at 6 
percent of GDP in 2001. 
(see Turkey commentary) 
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The bottom right panel of Figure 1 shows the evolution of capital flows to all 
emerging markets and the progression of crises.  The halcyon days of capital flows to 
emerging markets took place during the first half of the 1990s and held up at least for a 
short time after Mexican crisis and its contagious effects on Argentina.  But the east 
Asian crisis brings another wave of contagion along the marked decline in capital flows 
in 1997.  The Russian crisis of August 1998 delivers another blow from which emerging 
market flows never fully recover in the 1990s.  As shown in the right bottom panel of 
Figure 1, this crisis is associated with the second major leg of decline in private capital 
flows to emerging markets.  Since Figure 1 is based on annual capital flow data, it 
significantly blurs the stark differences in capital flows during the pre- and post-Russia 
crisis.  Figure 2, which plots weekly data on emerging market bond issuance before 
(negative numbers) and after (positive numbers) the Russian default (dashed line) and, 
for contrast, the Brazilian devaluation on January 1999 (solid line).  The vertical line 
marks the week of the crisis.   It is evident that bond issuance collapses following the 
Russian crisis and remains for over two months following the event; by contrast, the 
Brazilian devaluation had no discernible impact on issuance, which actually increases 
following the devaluation. 
As Figure 1 highlights, the next three crises--the Brazilian devaluation of January 
1999, the Turkish devaluation of February 2001, and the Argentine default at the end of 
2001—take place during the downturn of the cycle and at levels of net capital inflows 
that were barely above the levels of the 1980s drought.  Indeed, the estimates of capital 
flows to emerging markets in recent years shown in Figure 1, indeed, may actually be  
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overstated because total net flows include foreign direct investment, which held up better 
than portfolio bond and equity flows.  
 
Surprise Crises And Anticipated Catastrophes 
 Fast and furious crises and contagion cases have a high degree of surprise 
associated with them while their quieter counterparts are more broadly anticipated.  This 
distinction appears to be critical when “potentially affected countries” have a common 
lender.  If the common lender is surprised by the shock in the initial crises country, there 
is no time ahead of the impending crisis to rebalance portfolios and scale back from the 
affected country.  In contrast, if the crisis is anticipated, investors have time to limit the 
damage by scaling back exposure or hedging their positions. 
 Evidence that quieter episodes were more anticipated than the fast and furious 
cases is presented in Table 5.  Standard and Poor’s credit ratings had remained 
unchanged during the twelve months prior to of the Mexican and Thai currency crises.  In 
the case of Russia, the credit rating is actually upgraded as late as June 1998 when the 
broader definition that includes Credit Watch (CW) status is used.  The CW list lists the 
names of credits whose Moody’s ratings have a likelihood of changing. These names are 
actively under review because of developing trends or events which warrant a more 
extensive examination. Two downgrades eventually take place prior to the crises on 
August 13, 1998 and again on the 17th, the day before the default.  By contrast, Argentina 
has a string  (five) of downgrades as it marched toward default, with the first one taking 
place in October 2000, over a year before the eventual default.  Likewise, Brazil and 
Turkey suffered downgrades well before the eventual currency crisis. 
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Table 5  
Expected and Unexpected Crises:  
Standard and Poor’s Sovereign Credit Ratings Before and After Crises 
 
 
Country 
 
Crisis Date 
Change in rating  
(including Credit Watch) 
12 months prior to the 
crisis 
 
Change in rating 
after the crisis 
 
 
 
Fast and Furious Contagion Episodes 
     
Mexico December 21, 1994 None Downgraded two 
days after the crisis 
December 23, 1994 
 
     
Thailand July 2, 1997 None Downgraded in 
August 
 
Russia August 18, 1998 1 upgrade and 
2 downgrades (on the 
week of the crisis) 
 
1 further downgrade  
 
Crises with Limited External Consequences 
     
Brazil February 1, 1999 2  downgrades No immediate change  
     
Turkey February 22, 2001 1 upgrade and two 
downgrades 
I further downgrade 
the day after the 
crisis 
 
 
Argentina December 23, 2001 5 downgrades between 
October 2000 and July 
2001 
 
  
Source: Standard and Poor’s, Sovereign Rating History Since 1975. 
 
As further evidence that markets anticipated some of the shocks and not others, 
Figure 3 plots of the domestic-international interest rate differential for the Emerging 
Market Bond Index (EMBI) and the EMBI+ for two of the contagious episodes (Mexico 
and Russia, top panels) and for two crises without immediate international repercussions 
(Argentina and Brazil, bottom panels). 7   The patterns shown in these four panels are 
                                                 
7 The Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) tracks total returns for traded external 
debt instruments in the emerging markets. While the EMBI covers only Brady bonds, the 
EMBI+ expands upon the EMBI, covering three additional markets: (1) Eurobonds, (2) 
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representative of the behavior of spreads ahead of anticipated and unanticipated crises.  
(The vertical axis is measured in basis points, so a measure of 1000 means a gap of 10 
percentage points between the domestic borrowing rate and the international benchmark.) 
If bad things are expected to happen, risk increases and spreads should widen. The 
overall message is that fast and furious episodes are accompanied by sharp spikes in yield 
differentials – reflecting the unanticipated nature of the news -- whereas other episodes 
have tended to be anticipated by financial markets.  
The top left panel of Figure 3, which shows the evolution of Mexico’s spread in 
the pre-crisis period is striking.  In Mexico, spreads are stable at around 500 basis points 
in the months and weeks prior to the December 21, 1994 devaluation.  Indeed Mexico’s 
spreads remained below 1,000 until the week of January 6, 1995. Russian spreads, 
illustrated in the top right panel of Figure 3, show remarkable stability until a couple of 
weeks prior to the announcement and default.  In the case of Russia, the devaluation of 
the ruble appears to have been widely expected by the markets, as evident on the spreads 
on ruble-denominated debt.  One can conjecture that it was either the actual default or the 
absence of an IMF bailout  (following on the heels of historically large bail-out packages 
for Mexico and Korea) that took markets by surprise. 
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. dollar local markets, and (3) loans. The country coverage of the EMBI+ varies over 
time, currently including 19 members Current members are: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, and South Africa. The selection 
of countries and instruments follow four eligibility criteria imposed by JP Morgan Chase: 
(1) a minimum balance in outstanding, (2) rating, (3) remaining maturity, and (4) ability 
for international settlement. In order to construct the index of a specific country, a daily  
total return of each instrument is first computed, and then aggregated by market-
capitalization-weight.  
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The data presented in Figure 3 bottom panel illustrates the fact that markets 
foreshadowed turbulence in the cases of Argentina (2001) and Brazil (1999).  The left 
bottom panel of Figure 3 presents evidence for interest rate spreads for Argentina and  
shows that the cost of borrowing began to rise steadily and markedly well before its 
default on December 23, 2001.  In effect, since the week of April 22,spreads began to 
settle above 1,000 and since July 20 the never fell below 1,500. The bottom right panel of 
Figure 3 shows Brazilian spreads.  There is a run-up in spreads well before Brazil floats 
the real on February 1,1999.  This chart also reveals that Brazil—more so than 
Argentina—was quickly and markedly affected by the Russian crisis.   
In sum, we have provided suggestive evidence that anticipated crises are preceded 
by credit ratings downgrades and widening interest spreads before the crisis while for 
unanticipated crises the downgrades and widening of spreads come during the crisis or 
after the fact. 
Common Creditors 
  As noted, international banks played an important role in the transmission of 
some of the crises of the 1980s and the 1990s.  In the 1980s it was U.S. banks lending 
heavily to Latin America while in the 1990s it was European and Japanese bank lending 
to Asia, the transition economies and, in the case of Spanish banks, Latin America.  In the 
remainder of this section, we discuss the role that commercial banks and mutual and 
hedge funds have played in the recent contagion episodes. 
International bank lending to the Asian crisis countries grew at a 25 percent 
annual rate from 1994 to 1997 (or at a pace of about US$40 billion inflow per year.)  At 
the onset of the crisis,  European and Japanese banks’ lending to Asia was at its peak at 
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US$165 and US$124 billion, respectively, while the exposure of US banks was much 
more limited. Japanese banks had the highest exposure to Thailand, which also accounted 
for 26 percent of their total lending to emerging markets (the largest representation of any 
emerging market country in their portfolio.)  Collectively, the Asian crisis countries 
(excluding the Philippines, which did not borrow much from Japanese banks), accounted 
for 65 percent of the emerging market loan portfolio of Japanese banks.  For European 
banks, the comparable share was 23 percent. Following the floatation of  the Thai baht on 
July 2, 1997, the exposed banks retrenched quickly and cut credit lines to emerging Asia.  
The bank inflows quickly became outflows of about US$47 billion.   
As with Asia, lending to transition economies had accelerated in the mid-1990s. 
In the three years before the Russian crisis, international bank lending to the region grew 
at 14 percent per annum. German banks were more heavily exposed to Russia, with 
lending to Russia averaging about 20 percent of all their lending to emerging economies.  
As with earlier fast and furious contagion episodes, bank flows to the region, which 
oscillated around US$28 billion per year in the years before the crisis, turned into a 
US$14 billion dollar outflow in the year following the crisis. This retrenchment in 
lending helps explain why other transition economies were affected by the Russian crisis.  
However, it fails to explain why Brazil, Hong Kong, and Mexico come under significant 
pressures at this time.  To understand these and other cases, we need to turn our attention 
to non-bank common creditors. 
Equity and bond flows also declined sharply in the aftermath of the fast and 
furious crises of the 1990s.  For example, U.S.-based mutual funds specialized in Latin 
America withdrew massively from the region following the Mexican crisis in 1994.  As 
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discussed in Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2002), withdrawals from Latin America 
oscillated around 40 percent in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.  The countries most 
affected were Argentina, Brazil, and (of course) Mexico, which were the countries to 
which the mutual funds were most heavily exposed to in Latin America at the time of the 
crisis.  For example, if one examines the Latin American portfolio of mutual funds 
specialized in emerging markets at around the time of the crisis, Brazil, Mexico, and 
Argentina account for 37, 26, and 14 percent of their portfolio, respectively (i.e., three 
countries accounted for 77 percent of the Latin American portfolio)!  
The Thai crisis in 1997 also triggered equity outflows through mutual funds from 
Asia.  As discussed in Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2002), the countries most 
affected by abnormal withdrawals were Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, the 
countries with the most liquid financial markets in the region.  As was the case of the 
Mexican crisis, these were the countries to which mutual funds were heavily exposed.  Of 
the portfolio allocated to Asia, 30 percent was directed to Hong Kong, 7 percent to 
Singapore, and 13 percent to Taiwan.  They estimate that abnormal withdrawals (relative 
to the mean flow during the whole sample) oscillated at around 10 percent for the three 
economies.   
Similarly, highly leveraged funds seem to have had an important role in the 
speculative attack against Hong Kong dollar in August of 1998 following the Russian 
crisis see Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (2001).  According to the Financial Stability 
Forum 2000 Report of the Market Dynamics Study Group of the FSF Working Group on 
Highly Leveraged Institutions (2000), large macro hedge funds appear to have detected 
fundamental weaknesses early and started to build large short positions against the Hong 
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Kong dollar.  According to available estimates, hedge funds’ short positions in the HK$ 
market were close to 10 billion U.S. dollars (6 percent of Hong Kong’s GDP), but some 
observers believe that the correct figure was much higher.  Several large hedge funds also 
took very large short positions in the equity markets, and these positions were correlated 
over time.  As reported in the FSF study, among those taking short positions in the equity 
market were four large hedge funds, whose futures and options positions were equivalent 
to around 40 percent of all outstanding equity futures contracts as of early August prior to 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) intervention.  Position data suggest a 
correlation, albeit far from perfect, in the timing of the establishment of the short 
positions.  Two hedge funds substantially increased their positions during the period of 
the HKMA intervention.  At end August, four hedged funds accounted for 50,500 
contracts or 49 percent of the total open interest/net delta position; one fund accounted 
for one third.  The group’s meetings suggested that some large highly leveraged 
institutions had large short positions in both the equity and currency markets. 
 
Concluding Reflections 
To date, what has distinguished the contagion episodes that happened from those 
that could have happened seems to have had little to do with more “judicious” and 
“discriminating” investors—nor with any improvements to boast of in the state of the 
international financial architecture.  If investors behaved in a more discriminating manner 
in the recent crises where contagion could have happened but did not, it is because: i)  
those crises tended to unfold in slow motion and were thus widely anticipated; and ii) the 
capital flow bubble had been pricked at an earlier stage, when those same investors were 
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more “exuberant” and  iii)  hence, the “common creditor” we have stressed in our 
discussion was less leveraged in these episodes.  When looking back into history, one is 
struck by an overwhelming sense of “déjà vu.  It certainly seems a mystery why episodes 
of financial crises and contagion recur, in spite of the major costs associated with crises 
(this would seem to provide a sufficient motivation for avoiding them.)  But based on 
historical experience, there appears to be little hope that during the good times future 
generations of sovereign borrowers or investors will remember that the four most 
expensive words in financial history are “this time it’s different.”  
If history is any guide, financial crises will not be eliminated—as Kindleberger 
noted, they are hardy perennials. But it should be possible, based on the understanding of 
what causes contagion and what does not, for countries to take steps to reduce their 
vulnerability to international contagion.  
Contagion appears to be linked to a substantial inflow of capital to a country.  Of 
course, the prospect of financial autarky as a way of avoiding fast and furious contagion 
is not particularly attractive as a long run solution.  In fact, it may not even be feasible 
when countries have already liberalized the financial sector and the capital account.  But 
before turning to the issue of capital account restrictions, it is critical to remember that in 
many crises (most of those discussed here and many others), the lead and largest 
borrower in international capital markets during the boom periods are the sovereign 
governments themselves.  As Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) observe, it is the 
most debt intolerant countries with a history of serial default that can least afford to 
borrow that usually borrow the most.  Often the outcome is default. 
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So, as a first important step, the risk of contagion would be reduced if 
policymakers in countries that are integrated with world capital markets remember that 
many a surge in capital inflows often ends in a sudden stop—whether owing to home-
grown problems or contagion from abroad.  As a consequence, prudent policymaking 
would at a minimum ensure that the government does not overspend and overborrow 
when international capital markets are all too willing to lend, as most of those episodes 
end in tears. In contrast, fiscal policy in emerging markets currently tends to be markedly 
procyclical, with countries engaging in expansionary fiscal policy in good times and 
contractionary fiscal policy in bad times (Talvi and Végh, 2000).  Fiscal reforms aimed at 
designing institutional mechanisms that would discourage such procyclical behavior 
(particularly on the part of “provinces” or other autonomous entities) appear as an 
essential ingredient in preventing future crises from building up.  Such consistent self 
discipline, however, on the part of governments has historically proved elusive. 
As regards to curbing private borrowing from abroad, the issues are even more 
complex.  The best case for restrictions on international financial inflows would seem to 
focus on debt contracts with short maturities that are denominated in a foreign currency–
which have been the trigger in many modern contagion episodes. But although such 
policies may help in tilting the composition of capital flows toward longer maturities, 
their overall long-term effectiveness is unclear.  Curbing capital outflows, once 
contagion and the ensuing sudden stop has occurred, is even more problematic.  
Experience has shown that capital flight has been an endemic problem for countries that 
have tried to turn the clock back and re-introduce tight capital account and financial 
restrictions amidst economic turmoil. More fundamentally, pervasive capital controls 
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hardly seem likely to be the solution in the medium and long run to the contagion and 
sudden stop problem. 
As to new mechanisms in financial centers that could curb these periodic bouts of 
lending and “irrational exuberance” and lessen the likelihood of unpleasant future 
surprises, we remain very skeptical that there are easy or obvious solutions.  Access to 
more information may not lessen surprises when borrowers and lenders have often 
shown themselves willing to downplay worrisome fundamentals that are in the public 
domain in the late 1990s under the guise of having superior information. The economic 
historian Max Winkler wrote: 
“The over-abundance of funds, together with the difficulty of finding the most 
profitable employment therefore at home has contributed greatly to the pronounced 
demand for and the ready absorption of large foreign issues, irrespective of 
quality...While high yield on a foreign bond does not necessarily indicate inferior 
quality, great care must be exercised in the selection of foreign bonds, especially today, 
when anything foreign seems to find a ready market...Promiscuous buying, however, 
is destined to prove disastrous.” 
The New York Tribune, March 17, 1927 
In 1929 a wave of currency crises swept through Latin America—it was quickly 
followed by a string of defaults on sovereign external debt obligations.  At the time of 
this writing, with investors searching for high yields quickly snapping up emerging 
market bonds, Winkler’s warning rings as true now as it did then.
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Figure 3. Emerging Market Bond Yield Spreads, 1992 – 2002  1/
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